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2 1. Introduction.
In the mid-1990s Caterpillar closed a large plant in Pennsylvania and split its production
into four new smaller plants in Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky, and South Carolina.
According to published reports on the case, the move was precipitated by Caterpillar’s desire to
take advantage of substantial tax-relief incentives that had been extended.1  The fore-mentioned
Southern states had been offering incentives to Caterpillar for some time, yet Caterpillar had
been reluctant to relocate because the relatively small pool of skilled machinists in these states
was apparently deemed insufficient to support a “standard issue” Caterpillar plant.  This fact
notwithstanding, Caterpillar was eventually able to revise its production process into smaller
operations that could be dispersed across these four separate locations.
Previous economic literature has examined a number of issues connected with regional
competition for investment – most notably, whether competition among regions promotes or
impedes efficient location of production.  However, the above example points to issues that have
largely been ignored.  First, agglomeration externalities may be quite important in firms’ location
decisions and there has been almost no previous analysis of the interaction between these
externalities and regional competition for investment.  Clearly, such agglomeration externalities
can be an important element in regional competition for investment, as they lower costs for
firms, but also entrench them in certain locations.  This makes it more difficult for other
locations to attract these firms and possibly makes them less able to garner tax incentives.2
Despite this, the Caterpillar example above is one where a firm is clearly choosing location and
production techniques that weaken agglomeration externalities.  Second, despite typical implicit
                                                 
1 Caterpillar was also involved in protracted disputes with its unionized labor force in the northern U.S. states and
the “right-to-work” provisions in southern states were also likely part of their attraction to relocation possibilities.
2 On the other hand, if agglomeration externalities accompany firms when they relocate, they may be even more
prized by competing regions.
3assumptions, the production technologies that firms ultimately develop may themselves be
endogenously determined by the regional competition for investment process.  In particular, the
desire of firms to elicit favorable tax concessions may substantially impact the trajectory of
technical progress.  As we shall show, this link between regional competition and technical
innovation may induce inefficient behavior that is in turn compounded by the agglomeration
externalities that are often inherent to industrial development.
In this paper, we introduce endogenously determined technical innovation and
agglomeration externalities into a model of regional competition for investment.  We first present
a benchmark model of regional competition in which agglomeration externalities are present and
firms’ productive capabilities are specified exogenously.  Firms choose production plans (given
their fixed capabilities) and their location to maximize profits, while regions choose tax packages
to maximize a region’s welfare.  In such a world, we show that competition leads to Pareto
efficient location and production decisions by the firm.  This result obtains despite the possibility
of agglomeration externalities.  In fact, it is the regional competition that allows regions to
internalize the agglomeration externalities through the tax incentives they offer that is crucial for
an efficient outcome in the presence of such externalities.
We then relax the assumption of exogenously specified technology and allow firms to
carry out research and development (R&D) in a step prior to regional competition for their
investment.  The ability for firms to observably alter their productive capabilities proves to be far
from innocuous.   Indeed, we show it enables firms to distort the subsequent regional
competition and can lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes.  The intuition is that firms are able to
extract more favorable tax breaks when there is stronger competition amongst regions to secure
the firm as a “resident”.  This provides firms the incentive to choose technologies that do not
4strongly favor one region at the expense of all others, and are generally inferior from an
efficiency standpoint.  As a result, regional competition can also distort both production and
location decisions.  Furthermore, these inefficiencies may be exacerbated as a consequence of
the fact that firms’ inefficient location decisions may lead to weakened agglomeration
externalities.  In other words, firms may surprisingly choose technologies so that agglomeration
externalities are reduced, as Caterpillar did in the mid-1990s.  This provides one potential
explanation for why Ellison and Glaeser (1997) find less geographic concentration of U.S.
manufacturing than one would expect.
These results complement and contrast with previous literature in a number of ways.  The
natural intuition for many economists is that competition for investments by regions is akin to a
prisoner’s dilemma as it has little (if any) impact on eventual location decisions, but may
nonetheless lead to large transfers of regional tax revenues to the locating firms.  Our benchmark
model complements this conclusion by showing this result obtains even when accounting for
agglomeration externalities, provided firms’ production technologies are fixed.  This is an
important result in the sense that if the firms are owned by domestic shareholders, this
competition among regions results in transfers from the regions to the firm’s shareholders, but no
obvious loss in aggregate welfare for the country as a whole.3  The only notable welfare loss is
due to resources that may be “wasted” in the bidding process itself.
In fact, a number of previous studies have focused on reasons why competition may
actually promote more efficient location of production.   Bond and Samuelson (1986) focus on a
scenario of asymmetric information, where firms are uncertain ex ante about the productivity of
                                                 
3 If the firms are foreign-owned then these transfers have more obvious negative welfare implications for the host
country bidding for the investment, and this scenario lies behind Graham and Krugman’s (1995) recommendation
that the U.S. federal government ban state-level incentives directed at attracting foreign direct investment.  On the
5a particular region, but the region knows its productivity with certainty.   In such a scenario,
competition for firms facilitates efficient location of firms, as initially offered subsidies (or tax
holidays) signal the productivity of the region to the firm.  Black and Hoyt (1989) address
another inefficiency that may be alleviated by regional competition for investment.  Their
starting point is that most regions provide public goods and services (such as infrastructure) up to
the level that average costs equal average benefits because of standard public finance methods of
funding public goods.  When the marginal cost of providing public services to a potentially
relocating firm are smaller than the tax revenues the firm would yield for additional public
services, regions can offer subsidies that reduce the distortion caused by the average cost pricing
of public services.  Thus, this leads to more efficient location of production across regions.  Like
Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996) examines two regions competing with subsidies for
investment in an environment of perfect information.  While most previous studies focused on
cost differences between regions, Haaparanta (1996) shows that demand conditions in the region
(assuming all or most production is for local consumption) impacts that region’s offered
subsidies as well.  Thus, a high-cost country may attract investment in a competitive
environment due to demand conditions.  Furthermore, depending on how demand and cost
conditions are affected by investment, a subsidy competition between regions may result in
different firm location than if there were no such competition.  King, McAfee, and Preston
(1993) explore a bidding war between two regions for an investment where no participant in the
bidding process (either the firms or the regions) know the productivity of the region with
certainty until the firm is located, but where subsequent relocation of the firm is possible.  The
model yields efficient outcomes even when the regions first play a game in infrastructure
                                                                                                                                                              
other hand, Davies (2000) shows that state/regional competition can be welfare improving for a union of
states/regions if investment involves positive externalities for other states/regions in the union.
6investment (where greater infrastructure yields higher surplus from investment) prior to the
bidding process.
In summary, most recent theoretical literature on regional competition for investment has
almost exclusively focused on how regional competition may promote efficiency or at least lead
to efficient outcomes despite imperfect or asymmetric information on the part of various
participants.  In contrast, this paper points out that there are potentially serious inefficiencies
induced by regional competition that go beyond resources used to participate in the bidding
process.  These inefficiencies affect firm location, production technique, and the agglomeration
externalities that accrue.  Perhaps the most closely related literature to ours is work by Eaton and
Gersovitz (1984), Brander and Spencer (1987), and Bond and Samuelson (1989).  These papers
examine a bilateral bargaining process between a firm and a host region and consider the
possibility of renegotiation or even unilateral action by the region (such as expropriation) after
the firm has located in the region.  One general result of these papers is that firms with flexible
production techniques will respond by choosing inefficiently less capital-intensive production
processes when initially investing in a host region.  These papers focus only on a bilateral
negotiation between one firm and one region, in contrast to our regional competition model with
multiple regions and firms.  In addition, they do not consider agglomeration externalities.  The
only theoretical paper that we have found to consider competition for investment in the presence
of agglomeration externalities is Ludema and Wooton (2000).4  Their focus is on how exogenous
changes in agglomeration affect the intensity of tax competition across regions, whereas ours
                                                 
4 Head and Ries (1996) and Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) examine the impact of both regional incentives and
agglomeration externalities on firm investment decisions in an empirical setting.  Both studies find evidence that
agglomeration externalities attract investment, while Head and Ries (1996) find that agglomeration externalities
enhance the effect of regional incentive policies.
7examines how agglomerative forces affect Pareto efficiency of outcomes from regional
competition for investment and are endogenously determined by such competition.
A final departure of our paper from previous literature is our use of case study evidence.
Previous literature has only provided evidence that regional competition for investments exists
and can be intense, whereas our more detailed analyses provide examples of region and firm
behavior that is consistent with important assumptions and implications of our model.  This
seems to be novel in the literature despite the accessible and substantial media accounts of the
region-level bidding process for high-profile investments.  While case study evidence has well-
known limitations, we feel it is important for the literature to develop models that are
demonstrably consistent with cases we observe in reality, rather than create a myriad of
theoretical possibilities.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents our benchmark model of regional
competition in the presence of agglomeration externalities, but with fixed production capabilities
of the firm.  Section 3 expands the benchmark model to include strategic investment in R&D and
thus allowing for the endogenous determination of technical innovation.  Throughout these
sections we provide relatively brief case study evidence that is consistent with our model’s
implications.  A final section concludes.
2. Regional competition for investment: Benchmark model.
2.1. Theory.
This section introduces models of region/firm location games - interactive environments
in which regions actively use tax incentives as an inducement for firms to locate within their
borders.  An important feature of such environments is that the coalescing of firms in a given
8locality may in of itself affect their profitability, i.e., agglomeration externalities may exist.
Examples include the resultant influx and training of skilled workers, enhancements to local
infrastructure, expansion of supporting service industries, etc.  Our analysis demonstrates that
equilibrium behavior supports Pareto efficiency even in the presence of agglomeration
externalities, provided firms are not actively engaged in research and development.  (The case of
endogenously determined technical innovation is examined in the following section.)
The decision making agents in our model are composed of a finite set I of firms and a
finite set M of regions/municipalities.  Each firm must select both a region in which to locate and
a production plan to employ.  Each region must select a profile of tax incentive packages to offer
firms, incentives that may be contingent on both firm location and production decisions.  Such
contingencies may reflect, for instance, the imposition of zoning restrictions, pollution penalties,
hiring quotas, etc.
To formally characterize the action spaces outlined above, we let X=M denote each firm’s
space of location plans and let Y represent the space of all input employment plans, which we
assume to be a closed subset of a finite Euclidean space.  Thus XI=¥iŒIX and YI=¥iŒIY represent
collective location and production plan spaces respectively.  It is also convenient to abuse
notation and let m(xI)={iŒI| xi=m} for each mŒM and xI=(xi)iŒIŒXI.  In other words, m(xI) is the
set of all firms selecting region m according to the location choice profile xI .
We assume that regions have full flexibility in their tax policy design.  Formally, a tax
strategy for region m is a mapping tm: XI¥ YI Æ¬I that specifies in-region firm taxation levels that
may be dependent on in-region firm actions but are independent of out-of-region firm actions.
Naturally, we shall also assume regions are incapable of taxing firms outside of their jurisdiction.
9Let Tm  denote the space of all such tax policies for region m and let TM = ¥mŒMTm denote the
space of all tax policy profiles.  It may also be worth emphasizing that we place no
differentiability or continuity constraints on taxation strategies.  As a consequence, our general
notion of “tax strategy” effectively encompasses any regulatory device that may be used to
control firm behavior.  For instance, pollution controls may be mimicked by the imposition of
large lump sum penalties for discharges in excess of specified standards.
To recap the sequence of play: regions begin by simultaneously announcing their
respective taxation policies and firms respond to these announcements by selecting both a region
for their home operations and a production plan.  A firm strategy is thus a tax-policy-contingent
plan-of-action, i.e., a mapping s:TMÆX¥Y.  The space of all such mappings is denoted by S and
the space of firm strategy profiles is SI=¥iŒIS.  Given a profile of firm and region strategies sI and
tM it follows that tm(sI(tM))i represents the tax imposed by region m on firm i.
We now turn to a specification of region and firm preferences.  Each region mŒM is
assumed to be endowed with a real-valued welfare function wm : XI¥ YI Æ¬ which is
independent of the choices of firms locating outside of region m, i.e., if (xI,yI) represents the
collective profile of firm actions, then wm is independent of xi and yi whenever iœ m(xI).
Similarly, each firm iŒI is endowed with a real-valued profit function pi: XI¥ YI Æ¬, which we
assume is independent of the choices of firms that do not locate in i’s chosen region, i.e., pi  is
independent of xj  and yj whenever xjπxi.
Finally, we assume that both region and firm preferences are quasi-linear in tax
payments.  Thus, a region’s net welfare is the sum of the welfare it receives from realized firm
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decisions and that it receives from the tax revenues it collects.  Similarly, a firm’s net profit
function is the difference between the profits it receives from realized firm decisions and the tax
payment it owes to its home region.  Formally, if (sI, tM) represents a profile of firm and region
strategies, m and i respectively represent a given region and firm, H represents all firms locating
in region m and n is the region in which i chooses to locate, then region m’s net welfare is
wm(sI(tM))+ÂjŒHtm(sI(tM))j  and firm i’s net profit is pi(sI(tM)) – tn(sI(tM))i .
A profile (tM*,sI*) of region and firm strategies is an equilibrium if no region or firm can
benefit from unilaterally altering its strategy.  Such a profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if
the firm strategies are in equilibrium on every tax policy subgame.5
Theorem 1: Every subgame perfect equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Proof:  Suppose there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (tM*,sI*) which is not Pareto
optimal.  It follows there must exist a region m, a set of firm’s JÕI, and payoffs wm´, (pj´)jŒJ that
strictly dominate the payoffs these agents would receive from (tM*,sI*) and which are feasible
when the firms in J locate in m.  Let (yj´)jŒJ denote production plans that would support these
dominating payoffs.  Let tm´ be a tax policy such that for each jŒJ, firm j is ensured precisely the
payoff pj´, irrespective of the actions of others, as long as j locates in region m and adopts the
production plan yj´.  Further assume that tm´ deters firms in J from choosing alternative
production plans with a threat of high taxes.  Likewise, assume firms outside of J are deterred
from entering m with a high tax threat.  Recall that firm strategies are assumed to be in subgame
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perfect equilibrium.  Thus if m adopts the tax policy tm´ instead of tm*, it follows that precisely
the firms in J will locate in region m and they will in turn select the production plans specified by
(yj´)jŒJ. By design, region m will then receive the payoff wm´.  We conclude that tm´  is a strictly
better response to (tM*,sI*) than is tm*, contradicting the assumption that (tM*,sI*) was a subgame
perfect equilibrium.  QED
This result reveals that while competition between regions for firms may well induce
some reallocation of wealth between firms and regions, equilibrium behavior will nonetheless
induce Pareto efficient location and production decisions.  Indeed, such competition effectively
enables regions to internalize the agglomeration externalities that would otherwise lead to Pareto
inefficient firm decisions.  The following case study highlights the extent to which regions may
design tax policy to internalize externalities and manipulate firm behavior.
2.2. Case study evidence.
Begun in 1993, Oregon’s Strategic Initiative Program (SIP) was designed to lure large
investments to the state by offering up to 15 years of property tax relief for up to $100 million of
assessed property.  Another interesting feature of the program is that participating companies
must also make a direct community service payment to the local government equal to 25 percent
of the abated amount, not to exceed $2 million per year.   The negotiated agreements also
stipulate employment targets to receive the benefits of the program.
With semiconductor operations in Gresham, Oregon since 1988, Fujitsu Microelectronics
was one of the first companies to take advantage of Oregon’s SIP program.  The community
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Recall that firms observe tax policy prior to making their location/production choices, thus every profile of tax
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service projects money from Fujitsu’s SIP payments went into supporting a variety of programs
including a microelectronics training center at a local community college; transportation,
childcare, and housing programs for its employees; training of low-income and at-risk workers;
and efforts to meet ever-increasing targets on the purchases of local goods and services.
Obviously, these are all activities that the company would not necessarily have participated in
without the stipulations of SIP and some of the activities are ones that extend positive
externalities to other firms in the region.
In 1997, with (unexpected) downturn in prices of the current generation of chip Fujitsu
was producing, Fujitsu specifically asked the state and local governments for renegotiation of the
SIP contract, particularly to the employment targets.  As reported by the Portland Oregonian,
“Fujitsu said it wanted out of its SIP contract because a downturn in the memory-chip business
would prevent it from creating all the 445 jobs promised.” (Portland Oregonian, August 22,
1997)  After six months, a new agreement was reached with less property tax relief for Fujitsu in
exchange for lower employment levels, but continuation of many of the community service
payments by Fujitsu.
This case-study clearly demonstrates the efforts of a region to use tax policy as a
mechanism to influence factors beyond just the selection of firm location.  As in our theoretical
model, the state of Oregon has preferences over how firms choose to operate (what services they
offer, who they choose to hire, who they choose to purchase from, etc.) as well as where they
choose to locate.  Moreover, there is a recognition that such factors may create externalities for
other firms or workers that may locate in the region and may prove instrumental in additional
recruitment efforts.  Given that regions do indeed employ such tax policy tools, our benchmark
                                                                                                                                                              
policies effectively determines a distinct subgame within the comprehensive dynamic structure.
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theoretical model would appear to be a reasonable facsimile of the real world – provided that
production technology is exogenously specified.  We turn to the endogenous determination of
technology in the following section.
3. Competition for investment with endogenous technical innovation.
3.1. Theory.
The benchmark model outlined in previous section does not allow for firms to alter their
productive capabilities through investments in research and development (R&D).  In many real
world settings, however, the willingness of a firm to relocate may well depend on its ability to
effect change in its production alternatives.  For instance, current technology may dictate that
profits be very dependent on the availability of highly skilled workers, while R&D efforts may
yield new technologies that substantially mitigate this dependence and render firms more
geographically mobile.  Similarly, the willingness of a region to actively lure a firm may depend
on the firm’s ability to adopt production methods that are to the region’s liking (hire local
workers, purchase local goods, pollute minimally, etc.).  In this section we enrich our model by
formally introducing an R&D investment stage to the competition for firm investment game.
The resulting structure will be referred to as an R&D/firm location game.
It should be noted that we use the phrases “R&D” and “technology” in a rather liberal
sense.  Indeed, R&D efforts might literally be aimed toward the discovery of a new technical
process that improves productive efficiency, as one might traditionally envision.  However,
efforts to establish political connections and contacts in a region or obtain a clearer
understanding for how best to employ region specific resources may also be effective in
expanding a firm’s production possibilities.  For the purposes of our theoretical model, there is
14
no reason to distinguish between the various avenues for expanding production possibilities.
Consequently, we shall refer to all such efforts as “R&D” and refer to the ensuing expansion of
production possibilities as improvement in “technology”.
We now turn to the formal details of our model.  Let us assume that each firm iŒI is
endowed with a set Qi  of investment strategies from which it may select.  For each qi ŒQi let
ci(qi) denote the cost the firm incurs from this investment strategy.  For simplicity, we suppress
the effects of risk and uncertainty and assume that R&D investment leads to certain outcomes
regarding technical “know-how” and its effects on firm profit and region welfare functions.
Letting G denote the game outlined in section 1, this R&D extension effectively indexes the
game by qI as profit and welfare functions alike are dependent on the state of technology, and
thus are in turn dependent on the R&D strategies pursued by firms.  Indeed, different states of
technical innovation may lead to different levels of profit and productivity, different levels of
agglomeration externalities, different levels of pollution, different levels of local employment,
etc.  This addition of an R&D stage transforms our benchmark model into an R&D/firm location
game with the following sequence of play.  In stage 0, firms simultaneously commit to R&D
strategies.  These commitments are observable to all firms and all regions in subsequent periods
so that choices in these periods may be made contingent on realized R&D decisions.   The profile
of R&D strategies qI generated in stage 0 induces the two stage game G(qI), which is identical to
the benchmark structure outlined in section 1 except that each firm i’s profits are reduced by
ci(qi).  In particular, the welfare function of region m is of the form wm(•|qI) and profit function of
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firm i is of the form pi(•|qI)- ci(qi).  As was the case for production plans, we assume that welfare
and profits are independent of the choice of firms locating outside of the relevant region.
One might expect that since Theorem 1 implies that subgame perfect equilibria induce
Pareto efficiency on G(qI) for each conceivable profile of R&D strategies qI, it must follow that
efficiency will also prevail in the R&D/firm location game.  Such expectations are unfounded.
Theorem 2: Subgame perfect equilibria of the R&D/firm location game may induce Pareto
inefficiency.
Proof:  We demonstrate the validity of our claim by construction.   So as not to distract with
superfluous complexity, we construct a simple and intuitive example.  We emphasize that this
simple counter-example should not be interpreted as representative of all R&D/firm location
games in which inefficiency prevails as the classes of all such examples are many and varied.
Assume that there is a single firm, a single feasible production plan, two R&D strategies -
q(1)  and q(2), and two regions competing for the firm’s investment.  The following table
summarizes the cost of these two R&D strategies as well as the profit and welfare realized when
the firm locates in region1 and region2, respectively.  Assume that when the firm does not locate
in a particular region, that region’s welfare is zero.
locate in region1 locate in region2
cost firm profit region1 welfare firm profit region2 welfare
q(1): 1 3 3 0 1
q(2): 1 1 1 1 2
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The intuition of this example is straightforward.  Both R&D strategies are equally costly, but
yield distinct results.  The first R&D strategy takes advantage of features specific to region1
(highly skilled labor, for instance) and is not well suited to locating in region 2 (which may lack
highly skilled labor, for instance).   The second R&D strategy generates a production technology
that has less peak production/profit potential, but which is more location neutral.  Region2 is
more “eager” for firm investment, so it values this modest productivity more highly than
region1.  (One might feel compelled to include both a “status quo” technology and a
“comprehensive” technology in which the best of both q(1)  and q(2) are realized.  However, if
the status quo technology is strictly dominated by the alternatives described, there is nothing lost
in its omission.  Similarly, if the comprehensive technology is prohibitively expensive, it too
may be neglected without loss of generality.)
As the reader can readily verify, equilibrium under the q(1)- subgame  results in the firm
locating in region 1, paying 2 units profit in taxes, and earning zero net profit (after R&D costs
and taxes).  Equilibrium under the q(2)- subgame results in the firm locating in region 2,
receiving a subsidy of 1, and earning a net profit of 1 (after R&D costs and subsidy).  As the firm
has the power to select the subgame through its choice of R&D, it will select the q(2)-subgame,
an inefficient outcome. QED
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward.  Investments in R&D affect firm
profits as well as region welfare, much like firm production plans.  However, unlike a production
plan that can be location specific, the state of technical innovation affects welfare potential in all
regions and the potential profits of all firms.  That is, while firms may choose different
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production plans (different plant designs, different input employment, etc.) at different locations,
the constraints imposed by what is technologically feasible apply universally.6  Such all-
encompassing “shadow externalities” affect equilibrium behavior but cannot be internalized by
tax policy, implying that inefficiency may inevitably follow.
We note that the proof of Theorem 2 does not rely on inefficiencies resulting from
weakened agglomeration externalities, though it is certainly possible to construct such an
example.  In particular, one could add another firm to the example above and construct an
example where regional competition leads to firm location in separate regions, despite positive
agglomerative externalities for joint location by the firms in the same region.
While the constructive example used in the proof of Theorem 2 is a plausible abstraction,
we can say something more concrete about the conditions under which we would expect
inefficiencies to occur.  To do so, we must first construct a formal characterization of the
aggregate effects induced by a firm choosing to locate within a particular region.  Loosely, the
potential impact firm i has in region m will be defined to be the incremental effect of firm i
locating in region m as measured by the sum of region welfare and the firm profits generated
within the region.  In particular, this measure incorporates all effects of agglomeration
externalities.
Take as given both the R&D decisions of all firms and the location and production
decisions of all firms except a given firm i.  We define the potential impact firm i has in a given
region m as the largest impact firm i can have in region m under the given circumstances.  To be
more precise, let SUM1* denote the sum of region m welfare and the sum of all profits earned
within region m (including firm i) when firm i locates in m and chooses production plans which
                                                 
6 Of course, quality and quantity of available inputs may differ across regions, so technology constraints may be
more confining in some regions than others.
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maximize this sum (the plans of all other firms remaining fixed as well as firm i’s R&D plan).
Let SUM2 be defined as equal to the sum of region m welfare and the sum of all profits earned
within region  m (no longer including firm i) when firm i locates elsewhere.  Then the potential
impact of firm i on region m is equal to SUM1* minus SUM2.   We further define the 1st  best
potential impact of  firm i as the highest potential impact firm i has amongst all regions.  More
generally the rth best potential impact of firm i is iteratively defined as the highest potential
impact firm i has amongst all regions outside of those in which the 1st through (r-1)th best
potential impacts are realized.
Finally, we define credible equilibria to be those subgame perfect equilibria in which
only credible tax incentives are offered by regions, i.e., no region offers a firm incentives that
exceed the potential impact the firm can have in the region.  Of course incentives that are
accepted must be credible even in regular subgame perfect equilibria.  Consequently, this added
credibility restriction is only binding off of the equilibrium path – incentives that are offered but
not accepted.  The narrowing of our focus to credible equilibria is, in practical terms,
noncontroversial.  Indeed, it is unlikely that regions would take the effort to design tax incentives
that they would never want accepted.
We now have the machinery to articulate the following important result.
Theorem 3: If an R&D firm location game is in credible equilibrium then each firm
maximizes its 2nd best potential impact given the behavior other firms.
Proof: We claim that in credible equilibrium the after tax profit earned by the firm must equal
the potential impact that firm would have on its second choice region, given its equilibrium R&D
strategy.  Indeed, if this after tax profit were less than the noted potential impact, then the second
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choice region could unilaterally increase its welfare by altering the tax incentives it offers to
induce the firm to locate there; contradicting the assumption that firms and regions are in
equilibrium.  On the other hand, credibility implies that the tax incentives offered by the second
choice region cannot exceed the potential impact of the firm in question in the second choice
region.  As the after tax profit in the first choice region cannot exceed that which would be
earned in the second choice region (else the firm’s first choice could reduce the incentives it
offers and still induce the firm to locate there) the proof of our claim is complete.
As each firm seeks to maximize its profit and the above paragraph establishes that its
profit for each R&D strategy will equal its corresponding 2nd best potential impact, the firm will
invest in R&D in a manner which maximizes it 2nd best potential impact. QED
Note that Pareto efficiency requires, given the behavior of others, each firm to select the
R&D strategy that enables it to maximize its 1st best potential impact.  Appealing to Theorem 3,
we see that Pareto efficiency can be realized in a credible equilibrium only if for each firm, the
same R&D strategy can be used to maximize its 1st best as well as its 2nd best potential impacts.
We argue that such circumstances are relatively implausible.  We shall say that a firm’s
production technology is specialized if the production technique best suited for a particular
location and a particular set of agglomerating firms is less suited for alternative circumstances.
If the presence of any such specialization is required for efficiency to be realized, then
inefficiency can be expected to be the norm in all credible equilibria.  This conclusion follows
immediately by observing that specialization implies unequal 1st and 2nd best potential impacts
and noting that Theorem 3 thus implies inefficiency.  Our general result is highlighted with the
following Corollary.
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Corollary 4: Credible equilibria induce inefficiency whenever efficiency mandates
specialized production technology for at least one firm.
Corollary 4 is particularly important for understanding the role of agglomeration
externalities in the inefficiencies caused by regional competition.  The development and fine
tuning of the production methods for use in localities with strong agglomeration externalities is
generally quite different from the efforts that would be pursued if a firm were to instead locate in
a region where such externalities are modest or nonexistent.  Thus, the very tendency for
agglomeration externalities to emerge may itself dictate that at least some specialization be
present in order to realize Pareto efficiency.  In the light of Corollary 4, this fact in turn implies
that efficiency cannot be credibly attained in equilibrium.
3.2. Case study evidence.
There are a number of cases of U.S. states bidding for investment and subsequent firm
location decisions where the facts of the case are arguably consistent with model and results we
present in section 3.1 above.  We obviously do not observe welfare, profit, and efficiencies under
alternative scenarios and, thus, cannot test the model.  However, what we do observe in the
following cases is evidence of intense regional competition for large investments and a
surprisingly strong willingness by firms to substantially alter their production techniques in the
process to relocate to regions with obviously lower agglomeration externalities in a number of
dimensions.
As mentioned in the introduction, one such case is a plant relocation of the Caterpillar
company, maker of construction and materials handling equipment based in Peoria, Illinois.
When Caterpillar decided to close its “high-cost” plant in York, Pennsylvania it chose to separate
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and move production into four smaller sites in separate states in southeastern U.S. states
(Mississippi, North Carolina, Kentucky, and South Carolina), where wages were lower.  As
reported by Aron (1997), this was a long-term strategy by Caterpillar:  “While Caterpillar is not
moving jobs out of Peoria, the company’s expansion is in the South.  Due to more limited pools
of highly skilled labor, Caterpillar is spreading production among a larger number of smaller,
specialized plants.” (p. 1036).  This suggests an ongoing and concerted effort by Caterpillar to
devise production methods to make location in areas with lower concentrations of skilled labor
feasible, thus resulting in reduced agglomeration benefits in this dimension.
Another example consistent with our model in section 3.1 involves the well-known
Mercedes Benz automobile plant location in Alabama in the mid-1990s.  There was intense
competition for the plant with many states offering very large incentive packages.  When
Alabama won the bidding war for the Mercedes plant that would begin producing a new model
of SUV for sale in the United States, the press and state development experts widely decried the
massive incentives provided by Alabama to Mercedes which totaled over $250 million and
approximately $160,000 per job created for a $300 million plant. (Indianapolis News, April 1,
1998).  A large reason cited for the attractiveness of Alabama was the incentives, 30% lower pay
than in Germany, tradition of hostility toward unions, and access to ports. (Financial Times,
October 28, 1993).
However, experts in the field, as well as Mercedes own managers, stressed that Mercedes
location in Alabama came with a concomitant change in production process and there are
indications that many of these different production processes and “go slow” approach to ramping
up production were due to the workforce they were facing in Alabama.  For example, Sven
Schoolman, a 31-year-old trainer from a plant in Sindelfingen, Germany said:  “’In Germany, we
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don’t say we build a car.  We say we build a Mercedes. We had to teach that.’”  (Business Week,
March 31, 1997)  Similarly, a Washington Post article quoted James E. Harbour, an auto industry
consultant, as saying ’It is going to take a long time to bring that plant up to speed, because it is
now operating under the most difficult combination of circumstances with everything being all-
new.” (Washington Post, June 29, 1997)
In addition, there was evidence of much more permanent changes in production
technology and efficiency as the Alabama factory had much less automation than a typical
German factory with robots only involved in installing windows.  As summarized by Bill Taylor,
Vice President of Operations at the plant, “Plant automation was kept simple…We kept the
process of building an automobile as simple as possible because we already had all these
variables – new product, new people [most of whom are new to the auto industry], new plant…
People can only bite off and digest so much at a time.” (Industry Week, October 7, 1996).
In summary, these case studies provide evidence that firms made surprisingly substantial
modification to their production technology so that a move to a new location could be
economically sound.  For example, Caterpillar split one plant into four separate plants, and
Mercedes eliminated virtually all their robotic automation.  Both changes required massive
revision of the production process.
These investments also represented locations of firms’ plants away from traditional areas
with natural agglomerative features, such as a common pool of highly skilled labor and
established network of local suppliers, to areas without such features. Thus, these relocations
represent dramatic changes that likely reduce agglomeration externalities for these firms (and in
the industry in general to some extent).
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It’s possible that wage (and other cost) differentials alone precipitated these relocations.7
However, it is difficult to believe that the aggressive and substantial state incentives offered to
these plants did not contribute to the decision by these firms, particularly because of the firm’s
substantial efforts to alter production processes to fit attributes of the new location. It is also
important to note that inefficient R&D efforts are likely occurring even if relocation is not taking
place.  Aron (1997) documents the general tradeoff faced by many industrial machinery firms
between Midwest regions rich in skilled labor and low-wage less-skilled Southern regions with
aggressive state incentive programs and suggests that many firms have an ongoing evaluation
process of alternative locations.
4. Conclusion.
While acknowledging that regional competition for investment can be a prisoner’s
dilemma for the bidding regions, previous literature has found a number of theoretical reasons
why regional competition may promote efficient location of production.  In contrast, this paper
identifies new reasons for why regional competition may lead to inefficient outcomes – such
competition may induce the development of inefficient production techniques as well as
inefficient firm location and inefficient industry agglomeration.  Regional competition gives
firms incentives to develop (and potentially adopt) technologies that make alternative locations
more competitive.  This can allow the firm to extract surplus from regions that exceeds the
productive inefficiency costs of developing (and potentially adopting) new technologies.  In
addition, it may lead to inefficient location of investment with a concomitant lessening of
                                                 
7 For example, Hanson (1996) provides a model where agglomeration drives up wages in a center region due to
congestion, leading firms to relocate production to low-skill, low-wage peripheral regions.  Thus, it provides a story
of outsourcing certain steps of the production process rather than complete relocation of an integrated production
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agglomeration externalities.  While our results depend on firm production technique flexibility,
the case studies illustrate the surprising alterations in production technique that established firms
can and will make.
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